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PUTTING THE PLAINTIFF CLASS' NEEDS IN THE LEAD:
REFORMING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION BY EXTENDING
THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION OF THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Imagine that you discover that you are a winner of a class action
lawsuit and are due a modest damages award. You would be pleas-
antly surprised, right? Now suppose that upon further examination
you discover that your claim was actually worth more than what
you will recover under the settlement award, that the reward will
come in the form of coupons that require you to buy more of the
product that entitled you to damage awards in the first place, and
that the fee award that the class attorney arranged as part of the
settlement agreement will not only reduce your award, but will also
force you to pay the class attorney more than the award amount you
will receive! Given these additional insights, needless to say, you
are not nearly as thrilled with the outcome of this settlement
agreement.
Although the facts above are a bit extreme, such self-serving
settlement agreements negotiated by class attorneys at the expense
of class members actually do exist. For example, a settlement with
General Mills over its use of an illegal pesticide on the oats used in
its Cheerios resulted in class members receiving coupons that could
be exchanged for more cereal while six law firms split almost $2
million in costs and fees, plus interest.1 An even more perverse
settlement agreement arose after lawyers brought a class action
against Bank of Boston on behalf of 700,000 Bank customers who
"claimed the bank was keeping too much of its customers' money by
placing their funds in escrow accounts and denying them interest."2
1. Herb Field, Cereal Suit Only an Aid to Class-Action Lawyers, HARRISBURG PATRIOT
& EVENING NEWS, Apr. 5, 1995, at A7 ("The total retail value of this offer is supposed to
amount to at least $10 million."); Tony Kennedy, General Mills is Proposing a Giveaway to
Settle Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., Feb. 28, 1995, at Al; Saundra Torry, Going to the Head of the
Class Action Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1996, at F7.
2. Sherman Joyce, "Class Action" Clients Often Fleeced by Greedy Lawyers, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., May 7, 1998, at 13B; see also Marcia Coyle, Class Action Abuses May Get High Court
855
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The judge approved a settlement that forced the Bank to pay $8.5
million in attorneys' fees and $10 to each customer.3 In an
interesting twist, however, the attorneys' fees amounted to $100 per
customer and the agreement required the Bank to deduct the fees
from each customer's account.' The lawsuit thus cost each class
member $90!
Courts have long struggled to discover the mechanism to employ
in class action litigation that will best enable class members to
monitor their counsel and therefore prevent such egregiously
unfavorable settlement awards.5 The overarching goal of any
method used to manage class action suits is to establish
"monitoring mechanisms to substitute for the ordinary attorney-
client relationship."' By simulating this relationship, the court,
society, and the plaintiff class will be better assured that class
counsel will make litigation decisions out of concern for the
interests of the plaintiff class and not themselves.7 In the typical
attorney-client relationship, the client retains the power to accept
or reject any settlement and has the power to negotiate the lawyer's
compensation in advance.8 These constraints, however, are not
present in class action litigation: "Plaintiffs' attorneys typically do
not rely on named plaintiffs for vital testimony, do not bargain with
named plaintiffs over the fees they will be paid, and do not require
named plaintiffs' approval of the terms on which they propose to
settle class actions.' The conflicts of interest inherent in class
actions have led critics to claim that class action attorneys are more
Review, NAT'L L.J. May 5, 1997, at A12.
3. Joyce, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE OF THE SELECTION ON CLASS COUNSEL: FINAL REPORT 1,
[hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT], available at httpJ/www.ca3/
uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
6. Id. at 10.
7. Jill E. Fisch,Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 56 (2001) (discussing how
monitoring has the potential to improve litigation procedures and to reduce costs).
8. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2065 (1995).
9. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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interested in maximizing their fee when settling a case than in
attaining a fair award for class members.1"
The primary tool that courts use in class action litigation to
simulate the traditional attorney-client relationship is the selec-
tion of both the class counsel and the class representative. Rule
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court
to ensure that the "representative parties [lead plaintiff and lead
counsel] will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class."11 Traditionally, the court has had discretion to choose the
lead plaintiff and counsel, and judges either approve a private
agreement among lawyers to determine who will represent the
class, or in cases where there is no agreement, decide who should
serve as lead counsel.' 2 This selection process, however, has
recently become subject to intense scrutiny because of the
introduction of two new selection methods: judicial auctions and
the "empowered plaintiff" provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).18 Both the Task Force on
Selection of Class Counsel appointed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules have recently
considered and evaluated different methods for selecting class
representatives.14
Professors Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman proposed that
one way to reduce the conflict of interest between class members
and their counsel in securities class actions is to use market forces
to encourage and appoint more qualified lead plaintiffs to oversee
lead class counsel.'" Congress implemented this strategy in the
10. Id.
11. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a)(4); see also A.J. STEPHANI & GLEN WEISSENBERGER,
WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 2000 LITIGATION MANUAL 170-71 (2000).
12. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6; Third Circuit Judge
Convenes Task Force to Study Selection of Lead Class Counsel, 69 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2489 (Feb.
20, 2001).
13. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 1; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(aX3) (2000).
14. THmDCIRCUrrTAKFORCEFINALREPORT, supra note 5, at 1; Minutes, Mar. 12,2001,
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM. 9, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRACMM01.pdf
(last visited Sept. 1, 2002) (discussing the draft for the attorney appointment Rule 23(g)).
15. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2107.
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PSLRA. 6 Congress created a system in which the lead plaintiff
would choose the counsel for the class, subject to review by the
court.'7 The best choice for lead plaintiff is presumptively the
member of the class who has the largest financial stake.'" The
theory, which Weiss and Beckermen argued and which Congress
adopted, is that institutional investors, because of their large
financial stake in the outcome of the litigation, will have an
incentive to monitor lead counsel and will also "have or could
readily develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs'
attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class." 9
This model appears to more closely align the interests of the
plaintiffs' attorneys with the interests of the plaintiff class than
traditional court-appointment methods.
Recent studies and cases show that institutional investors are
beginning to take a more active role in securities class actions
under the PSLRA and are achieving higher settlement amounts.20
In light of this development, this Note argues that the provisions of
the PSLRA requiring (1) that the lead plaintiff be more credible and
involved in the litigation and (2) that the lead plaintiff choose lead
counsel create a better framework for ensuring adequate class
representation in Rule 23(b)(2) class action lawsuits for money
damages than allowing the court to directly appoint class counsel
21or conduct auctions.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(aX3); S. REP. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(3)(B)(v).
18. Id. § 78u-4(aX3)(B)(iii)(IXbb)
19. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2095.
20. William S. Lerach, Achieving Corporate Governance Enhancements Through
Litigation, Keynote Address Before the Council of Institutional Investors Spring Meeting
(Mar. 27, 2001) (discussing how participation by institutional investors is increasing
settlement recoveries which in turn is encourages more participation by institutional
investors), available at httpJ/www.enronfraud.com/pdf/corp-gov.pdf (last visited Sept. 1,
2002). See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case
Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 559-64,
582-84,599-604 (1996) (explaining the reasons institutional investors are reluctant to become
lead plaintiffs and how the PSLRA provides incentives for institutional investors to overcome
this reluctance).
21. For an opposing view regarding the effectiveness of auctions, see Charles H. Gray,
Note, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Auctions as an
Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 829 (2002).
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For class actions such as mass tort and small claims litigation in
which the lead plaintiff provision will not be more effective, many
reform alternatives exist that will improve the class' ability to
monitor its counsel. Mass tort class litigation could be improved by
increasing the opportunity for class members to opt out in response
to an inadequate settlement agreement. Small claims class actions
would benefit from (1) providing judges with more information with
which to review settlement agreements, (2) employing a loser-pays
fee shifting mechanism, (3) imposing sanctions on class counsel who
enter into abusive settlement agreements, and (4) subjecting
settlement agreements to greater scrutiny by the public.
This Note critically analyzes current class action reform
proposals and the probable outcome of employing the lead plaintiff
provision in more types of class action litigation. By way of back-
ground, Part I provides insight into the rationale for class action
litigation and the challenges it presents. Part II discusses and
evaluates the PSLRA and current class action reform proposals.
Part III discusses successful elements of the lead plaintiff provision
in securities class actions and the types of class actions in which the
provision can be most successfully employed, namely antitrust
actions. Having proved that the lead plaintiff provision can be
extended to some class actions, Part IV provides some insights into
alternative reform measures for those areas in which it cannot be
similarly extended.
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Although the exact motivation behind the drafting of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remains unclear,22 it has
22. See DEBORAH R. HENSLERETAL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOAlS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 12 (2000). Scholars continue to debate how the Rule 23(bX2) revisions
drafters intended for it to be used. It is relatively clear, however, that given the context in
which Rule 23(bX2) revised in 1966, Rule 23(bX2) was designed to afford racial minorities an
easier avenue by which to effect social transformation. Cf STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 238-39 (1987). It is less clear,
however, that the rule drafters intended Rule 23 to permit class action lawsuits that would
act as "private, market-driven supplement[s] to governmental regulation of the economy" or
"private-attorney-general-suits. Id. at 239, 248. According to Yeazell, Rule 23 was not
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effectively allowed class members to pursue litigation and receive
damages for claims that involve such small losses that they could
not realistically be pursued individually.2" Some argue that the
original intent of the drafters was to "enable litigation that could
not be brought on an individual basis, in pursuit of larger social
goals such as enforcing government regulations and deterring
unsafe behavior. 2' The reality, however, is that the majority of
class actions, and those which are the focus of this Note, involve
damage class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3) rather than social
reform actions seeking injunctions pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). 2
intended to achieve these goals because Rule 23(bX3) makes it more difficult for classes to
seek monetary damages and subjects these lawsuits to more judicial discretion than the
injunctive relief suits of Rule 23(bX2). Id. at 247. Others frame the debate over the Rule's
goals in terms of whether it was meant to be a tool of social policy or just a procedural tool
for the aggregation of claims.
The justifications that led to the development of the class action include the
protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of the
interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and economical means for
disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980) (citations omitted);
see also Class Action Lawsuits: Examining Victim Compensation and Attorneys' Fees:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Hon.
Paul V. Niemeyer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Cir.).
23. HENSLER ETAL., supra note 22, at 51; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 248.
24. HENSLER ETAL., supra note 22, at 48.
25. See id. at 52-61. Rule 23(bX2) primarily is used to bring civil rights actions seeking
injunctive relief: "[Tlhe party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ... " FED. R. CIV. P,
23(bX2). In comparison to Rule 23(bX2), class actions seeking damages pursuant to Rule
23(bX3) are much more difficult to pursue given the many factors that the court must
consider before allowing the suit. The text of Rule 23(bX3) is as follows:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition ... the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution of defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
860
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Damages class actions typically involve the areas of (1) consumer
cases alleging fraudulent business practices or antitrust violations,
(2) mass tort claims, and (3) securities class action suits. 26 Indeed,
in 2000, "almost one-third of the class actions pending in federal
courts were securities cases" commanding "more judicial time than
any other category of class action.""
Rule 23 requires "large numbers of parties (often termed the
'numerosity' requirement), brought together by common issues of
law or fact ('commonality'), represented by individuals or entities
whose claims or defenses are typical of those they represent
('typicality'), and who may be relied on to protect the interests of the
latter ('representativeness')."2' Historically, private attorneys have
assumed the role of finding legal violations, identifying individuals
to serve as lead plaintiffs, and filing class actions on behalf of the
group.' This role has evolved because of (1) the lack of incentive
and resources individuals who suffer small harms have to bring a
suit individually or to find others who have suffered similar harms
to bring an action collectively and (2) a strong incentive for
attorneys to bring the suits because of the fees that they will receive
if their suit is successful. 0 Attorneys' fees are more attractive in
class action suits than in ordinary litigation because judges
determine the amount an attorney will receive from a "common
fund," which consists of a pool of damages resulting from settlement
or litigation. 1 Lawyers receive compensation from the fund for
"creating it [the class action], as well as a risk premium for bearing
Id. 23(bX3). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, however, is a statutory provision separate from Rule 23 that permits a class to bring
disparate impact claims against a discriminatory employer and seek both an injunction and
a damage recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
26. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 52-68.
27. Phyllis Zipka Skupien, Esq. & Robert Woodman McSherry, Do Auctions Work? The
Controversial Method for Choosing Class Counsel and Setting Fees, 11 No. 4ANDREWS' PROF.
LAB. LrrIG. REP. 1, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1, 2.
28. HENSLER ETAL., supra note 22, at 13.
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 71-72. If they lose, however, the attorneys must cover their own expenses.
31. YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 248-49 ("[Cilass suits seeking money damages carry the
potential for high fees ... from that so-called common fund.... By contrast, in a suit that seeks
only injunctive relief, there will be no common fund and thus no fee to be recovered from it.");
see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 77.
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all the financial risks of litigation." 2 This differs from ordinary
litigation in which the parties themselves negotiate fee arrange-
ments with their attorneys before the litigation has concluded. 3
"Common fund cases" create strong incentives for lawyers to
negotiate the size of their fees as part of settlement negotiations,
which in turn are subject to approval by the judge. 4 Many believe
that the publicity regarding class action results, in which the
plaintiffs' attorneys received much larger amounts than class
members, contributed to judges assuming a more active role in
scrutinizing settlement fee provisions, controlling attorney fees, and
appointing lead counsel.3 5
The importance of settlement agreements and easy abuse by
class action attorneys becomes clearer in light of two important
facts. First, similar to most civil lawsuits, most class actions do not
go to verdict but instead end in a settlement agreement. 6 Second,
lead counsel typically do not seek or require class members'
approval of the terms on which they propose to settle class actions. 7
Rule 23(e) charges judges with approving settlements and deter-
mining whether settlements are "fair, adequate and reasonable."3 8
Because of the volume of settlement agreements resolving class
action suits and the slim judicial review of settlement agreements,3 9
it is not surprising that critics have argued for better devices to
32. THmRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
33. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 77.
34. Id. at 78-79.
35. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON THE SELECTION OF LEAD COUNSEL: DRAFT REPORT 5
(on file with author).
The Task Force suspects, but cannot be certain, that the adverse publicity
associated with some class action results, particularly the cases in which the
plaintiffs receive apparently little and the lawyers apparently much, have
affected not only the judicial willingness to approve settlements but might also
have incited in some judges the desire to become more actively involved in
controlling attorney fees. This may have contributed to an interest in some
judges in using the bidding process for appointment of lead counsel.
Id.
36. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 75.
37. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2065.
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e); see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 76.
39. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2067 ("Jludges generally feel pressured to
move their dockets and have an interest in approving settlements.... Lacking any incentive
to probe deeply, and lacking the time and information necessary to do so, it is not surprising
that courts tend to approve almost all class action settlements.").
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monitor lead counsel in negotiating settlement agreements that will
be (or are) in the best interests of the class and not in the best
interest of counsels' fees.
II. ANALYSIS OF ADEQUACY OF REFORM PROPOSALS FOR SELECTING
CLASS REPRESENTATION
A. Traditional Appointment Procedures
For comparison purposes, this analysis will first discuss the
methods courts have traditionally employed in selecting the class
counsel and the lead plaintiff. Most courts usually appoint the
attorney who files the first complaint as lead counsel.4' Other
courts, however, allow all lawyers who have filed suits containing
the same or similar claims to determine among themselves a
voluntary plan to allocate lead counsel responsibility, or, when this
"private ordering" fails, the court appoints lead counsel." Both of
these scenarios reward lawyers who file early and, thus, usually
result in what is commonly known as a "race to the courthouse."42
Criticism abounds of courts awarding lead counsel position to the
first lawyer to file a complaint.4" Chief among the criticisms is that
(1) the practice encourages attorneys to file "skeletal" complaints
based on skimpy research, and (2) filing first is not a good predictor
for the quality of the attorney's representation."
In October 2001, the Third Circuit Task Force,' 5 charged with
evaluating methods for selecting lead counsel, recommended not
only preserving the court appointment procedures regarding lead
counsel, but also enhancing the selection criteria by requiring
courts to consider more than simply which attorney filed the
40. Id. at 2062.
41. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6. Private ordering is
subject to approval of the court, which is usually granted. Id.
42. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2062.
43. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 33-35 (1995) (lamenting that speed
supplanted diligence in drafting complaints for class action suits that ultimately were
lawyer-driven).
44. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 99.
45. The Task Force was "made up of members of the judiciary, academics, plaintiff and
defense lawyers (including representatives of institutional investors such as pension funds),
and attorneys who are experts on the economics of the practice of law." Id. at 13.
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complaint first."6 The Task Force submitted a list of factors the
court should consider in selecting class counsel, most notably: the
amount of pre-filing investigation the attorney conducted, the
attorney's reputation in handling class action litigation, and the
effectiveness of the counsel's representation thus far. 7 The Task
Force's recommendations closely match those of a proposed
amendment to Rule 23, 23(g), which would require the court, when
appointing an attorney lead counsel, to consider:
(i) the counsel's experience in handling class actions and other
complex litigation, (ii) the work counsel has done in identifying
or investigating potential claims in this case, and (iii) the
resources counsel will commit to representing the class, and
[would allow the court to] consider any other matter pertinent
to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class.4
Proposed Rule 23(g)(2)(A) would also encourage the court to require
attorneys seeking appointment as lead counsel to apply for the
position within a "reasonable period after the commencement of the
action ..., although the court would retain discretion." 9
Both the Third Circuit Task Force and the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules also recommend stricter review of attorneys' fees.
50
They encourage courts to monitor the work of class counsel
throughout the litigation."
These reform measures, however, fail to solve the problems
associated with judicial review of appointing lead counsel and
settlement agreements. Defendants virtually never challenge the
46. Id. at 99-101.
47. Id.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2XB) (proposed July 2001), in PROPOSED RULES AMENDMENTS
PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT: REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., at 33 [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM.], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules.
49. Id.
50. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-02; FED. R. CIV. P.
23(h), in REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 48, at 14-16.
51. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(h) committee note (proposed July 2001), in REPORT OF THE CIVIL
RULES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 48, at 46; THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 101. The Third Circuit Task Force also recommends that judges "direct
counsel to propose the terms for a potential award of fees" to "provide a helpful structure for
the court when it conducts its reasonableness review at the end of the case." Id. at 101.
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appointment of lead counsel or settlement agreements.52 This is
because both plaintiffs and defendants want their agreement to be
accepted during the settlement hearing.' Without the adversarial
process to expose improper fee arrangements and settlement
agreements, even the most motivated judges are ill-equipped
to evaluate an agreement's reasonableness. 4 They are also con-
stricted by the limited record that is compiled during settlement
negotiations between the parties and therefore face further
difficulties in evaluating its fairness.55 Encouraging judges to more
strictly review negotiation agreements and select lead counsel is
ineffective because the reform measures do not provide judges with
increased access to information that would enable them to make
better decisions. Without access to better information in appointing
lead counsel, judges will, by necessity, continue to rely on such
inadequate factors as primacy in filing a complaint and personal
past experience with the attorneys who seek to serve as lead
counsel.5" These reforms, therefore, do not cure the inability of
judges to effectively monitor lead counsel and thereby prevent
unreasonable fee awards in settlement agreements.
B. Auction Method
Judge Vaughn R. Walker was the first to use the auction method
in In re Oracle Securities Litigation (Oracle V." The principal goal
of lead counsel auction is "to emulate the arrangements and
decisions that the class itself would make were it able to negotiate
[for legal services].' s Through a competitive bidding process,
prospective lead counsel submit proposals to the court by a
specified deadline. The courts often require proposals to include a
52. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (1991) ("[Slettlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel.").
53. See id. at 46.
54. Id. at 45-46.
55. Id. at 46.
56. TmRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11.
57. 131 F.R.D. 688, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Oracle I].
58. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467,468 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Wells
Fargo II].
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combination of monetary and nonmonetary factors. 59 Usually,
however, because the candidate firms are so similar with respect to
their experience and background regarding class action litigation,
the price the firm will charge is the deciding factor in selecting lead
counsel.6" "The cardinal assumption underlying lead counsel
auctions is that the best ways to maximize plaintiffs' net recovery
are to reduce the price of legal services through competition and to
encourage attorneys to contain their costs as much as possible."61
Although there have been variations on the lead counsel auction
method employed by Judge Walker in In re Oracle Securities
Litigation (Oracle II), it still illustrates the essential mechanics of
the method. In Oracle II, Judge Walker conducted a sealed-bid
auction and solicited bids from any firm wishing to act as lead
counsel for the class. Firms had to prepare and submit their bids
within a three-week period and discovery was neither taken nor
allowed during this time. Judge Walker selected the lowest bidder
within two months after the bids were submitted.62
Despite the novelty of the bidding approach in simulating a
competitive market and relieving the court of any obligation to
regulate attorneys' fees, it has not gained widespread acceptance.
Only five district courts and seven judges have employed this
59. Glen DeValerio, Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 1 PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR THE NEw
MILLENNIUM § III(B) (May 2000) (ALI-ABA Course of Studies Materials Course No. SE82,
May 2000), available at http://www.bermanesq.com/pdf/DeValerioALI_ABA.pdf; see, e.g., In
re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223,228-29 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Wells Fargo
I]. The court cited the following in support of its appointment decision:
1) The firm's experience, and those of the attorneys, 2) the firm's qualifications,
including its willingness to post a 'completion bond or other security for the
faithful completion of its services to the class," 3) the firm's malpractice
insurance coverage, 4) the percentage of any recovery the firm will charge in
the event of recovery, 5) other terms of the proposed fee arrangement, 6) certain
certifications on behalf of the firm regarding bid procedure.
Id. at 229.
60. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1827,
1839 (2000) [hereinafter The Paths of Civil Litigation].
61. Id. at 1839-40.
62. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Oracle II].
Judge Walker selected a bid in an order dated October 18, 1990. He had ordered the bid on
August 3. Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
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method of selecting lead counsel68 and only in securities (twelve
cases) and antitrust (two cases) class actions.64
Proponents argue for increased use of the auction method
because it lowered attorneys' fees in some cases, thereby providing
a larger portion of the settlement award to each class member.65
For example, lead counsel's $3.5 million fee in In re Amino Acid
Lysine Antitrust Litigation" amounted to 7% of the $49 million
settlement.67 Professor Joseph Grundfest of Stanford University
asserts that early evidence demonstrates the auction method's
effect of lowering attorneys' fee awards.68 In an ongoing study,
Grundfest found that the average fee award for securities class
action cases in the 1990s was about 30% of the settlement
amount.69 This is consistent with a 1996 study conducted by the
63. Skupien & McSherry, supra note 27, at 7. The five district courts are the Northern
District of California, Northern District of Illinois, District of New Jersey, Southern District
of Florida, and Southern District of New York.
64. Id. To date, the following class action lawsuits andjudges have used auctions to select
lead counsel: In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Kaplan,
J.); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. M. 2001) (Shadur, J.); In re
Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. C 01-00719 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Alsup, J.); In re
Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Walker, J.); In re Bank One
S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Shadur, J.); In re Lucent Tech.,
Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000) (Lechner, J.); Sherleigh Assocs., LLC v.
Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fl. 1999) (Lenard, J.); Wenderhold
v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Walker, J.); In re Network Assoc., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Alsup, J.); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D.
144 (D.N.J. 1998) (Walls, J.); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (Shadur, J.); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (Walker, J.); Wells Fargo II, 157 F.R.D. (Walker, J.); Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. (Walker, J.).
65. Skupien & McSherry, supra note 27, at 8.
66. 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
67. Lowell E. Sachnoff& Jeffrey T. Gilbert,Auctioning the Role of Lead Counsel in Class
Action Cases to the Lowest Bidder, in POST-GRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW:
ABA-ALI COURSE OF STUDY 541 (ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Education
ed., 1997).
68. Joseph A. Grundfest, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Proposal for Addressing a Problem that Has No Perfect Solution (An Outline of A Work in
Progress], in THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. B (June 1,
2001) (testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest).
69. Id. at 6.
The average fee award in 733 federal class action securities fraud cases filed
between January 1991 and May 1999 was approximately 30.12 percent of the
settlement amount. Thus, of the total $6.1 billion in settlements in these
actions, approximately $1.837 billion was paid to class counsel and $4.263
billion was retained by members of the class.
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Federal Judicial Center which found that attorneys' fees for all
class actions typically fell between 27 and 30% of the settlement
amount.70 In contrast, Grundfest discovered that in the few cases
that employed the auction method, the attorneys' fee awards ranged
from 7 to 21.2%, a markedly lower percentage.7' This range is also
lower than the normal range of between 25 and 33% that judges
typically award in class actions that do not utilize the auction
method; this difference raises questions about whether the normal
range accurately simulates market-driven fee awards.72
Judges are among the most enthusiastic supporters of the auction
method because, they argue, it conserves judicial resources by
quickly resolving cases that would have otherwise stayed on the
docket for years. For example, Judge Shadur originally considered
early resolution of Amino Acid Lysine"8 to be improbable. After
selecting lead counsel and establishing attorneys' fees using the
auction method, however, the case settled within months. 7' Judge
Walker contends that the auction method reduces "the amount of
judicial time it takes to monitor and administer large class action
cases and to determine an appropriate fee for class counsel at the
successful conclusion of such cases. 75
Id. (footnote omitted).
70. Kathryn Kranhold & Richard B. Schmitt, To Rein In Fees, Some Judges Ask
Attorneys to Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at B1. The 1996 study followed 400 class action
suits. Id.
71. Grundfest, supra note 68, at 7 (noting that the lowest fee was awarded in the $30
million settlement of In re Network Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017
(N.D. Cal. 1999), and the highest fee was awarded in the 1995 Wells Fargo settlement for
$13.5 million. Wells Fargo II, 157 F.R.D. 467,467 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Grundfest cautions that
these percentages are derived from cases "involving hard bargaining by competent, named
plaintiffis]." Grundfest, supra note 68, at 7. He also cautions against complete reliance on the
data because it is derived from a small sample of cases (the fourteen cases in which auction
methods have been employed) and because of the significant variance in the auctioning
procedures used by courts. Id.
72. Grundfest, supra note 68, at 6. Grundfest explained:
I am currently in the process of tracing back the roots of the 25 percent to 33
percent norm, and have as yet discovered no persuasive argument that the
norm was ever a reasonable approximation of the fee that would result from an
arm's length bargain over representation in a securities fraud class action
lawsuit.
Id. at 9.
73. 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. IMI. 1996).
74. Sachnoff& Gilbert, supra note 67, at 541.
75. Id. at 539 (quoting Judge Walker).
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Although class members may benefit from the more expeditious
conclusion of their case, they may also pay the price for the
resource-saving benefits of the auction method because it can
reduce the quality of their representation and the overall monetary
amount that class members ultimately receive. A principal criticism
of auctions is that the lowest price is not necessarily an indicator of
the quality of the representation. 76 The quality of representation is
likely to suffer because auctions diminish the incentives for lead
counsel to adequately invest in litigation." This is because the
auction process does not take into account the possibility that a
higher bidder may have budgeted for more resources to be invested
in the action, or is simply a higher quality firm that would have a
better chance for recovery of a higher settlement.78 Also, if firms
underbid, they could resort to settling too early or expending fewer
resources on the case in order to maintain a profit margin.
Auctions also dampen incentives for lawyers to discover potential
claims because there is no assurance that they will succeed at
auction and thereby recover their expenses.8 0 Even more, the
investigating firm will probably lose the bid because it starts the
bidding process with a disadvantage. It must factor its investi-
gatory expenses into the bid whereas a competing firm, which has
the benefit of the already filed complaint, has no investigatory
expenses, and therefore can submit a lower bid.8 ' Consequently,
higher-quality firms will have less of an incentive to represent a
plaintiff class in cases where they will have to compete to serve
as lead counsel because their efforts will not be rewarded if
noninvestigating firms consistently win the auction. 2 Indeed, this
process has already been termed the "lemon" problem: "[Hiigh-
quality firms are unwilling to represent victims of fraud and incur
76. THIRD CIRcuIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 46.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 45.
80. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-54; The Paths of Civil
Litigation, supra note 60, at 1843-44.
81. Darren J. Robbins & Fred B. Burnside, The Race to the Bottom: Bidding for Lead
Counsel and Its Impact on Securities Class Actions, in ADVANCED SECURITIEs LAW
WORKSHOP, 2001, at 311,361 (PLI Corp. Litig. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. BO-
OOUE).
82. Id. at 361.
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bidding costs to enter an unwinnable auction, leaving the court to
select from a motley crew of 'lemon' lawyers."" There is already
evidence that "plaintiffs' lawyers may simply vote with their feet"
and abandon any class action case in which the court will employ
the auction method to select lead counsel."' A shortage of qualified
bidders seriously undermines the ability of the auction process to
function.
In addition to the diminished quality in representation, the
auction method may also cause class members to receive a smaller
settlement award. Poorly designed bidding rules can create huge
disincentives for the winning bidder to maximize recovery for the
class.8" For example, in Amino Acid Lysine" one firm entered a bid
in which it would receive the following declining percentages: 20%
on the first $5 million recovered, 15% of the next $10 million, and
10% of the next $10 million. 7 The firm would therefore receive 0%
of amounts greater than $25 million and a maximum of only $3.5
million, even if recovery exceeded $25 million.88 Predictably, the
case settled for exactly $25 million "after only minimal discovery
had been completed and before the labor-intensive deposition
phase."89 The $25 million amount in this case is an example of what
is commonly referred to as a "fee cap." Many critics warn that fee
caps reduce class members' recovery amounts because they depress
plaintiffs' counsel's incentives to incur the risks associated with
pursuing a higher settlement amount.'o Furthermore, the fee cap
provides strategic information to defendants because they can
83. Id. at 362 (footnote omitted).
84. The Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 60, at 1844. In Wenderhold v. Cylink, 188
F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999), after Judge Walker requested competitive bids for the position
of lead counsel, only one of the six firms submitted a bid. Id. Furthermore, the law firms that
have become "gun shy" are those that specialize in class actions because they consider the
risk of investing resources into developing claims "too great in light of the statistical
probability that they will lose in the bidding process and go uncompensated for pre-bid work."
Robbins & Burnside, supra note 81, at 363. This lends further support to the theory that
auctions are discouraging the more experienced law firms and leaving class members to be
represented by "lemon" lawyers, if at all.
85. John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Class Auctions, 21 NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at B6.
86. 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. II. 1996).
87. Coffee, supra note 85; Scott Medintz, Big Suits: Lysine Antitrust Settlement, 18 AM.
LAW. 114 (1996).
88. Coffee, supra note 85; Medintz, supra note 87, at 114.
89. Medintz, supra note 87, at 114 (1996); Coffee, supra note 85.
90. Coffee, supra note 85.
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"conduct an expensive war of attrition" and force the plaintiffs'
counsel to exceed their budgeted expenses and incur un-
reimbursed costs.9 Even more alarming, if defendants know
that the winning bid used a declining-percentage-of-the-recovery
formula, the defendants will know that plaintiff's counsel will have
"little to gain from holding out for a larger settlement."92 Many,
therefore, strongly argue against using fee caps or the declining-
percentage-of-the-recovery formula. Instead, some, including
Professor John Coffee, an expert in class action lawsuits, 98 recom-
mend encouraging competing counsel to submit bids using an
increasing-percentage-of-the-recovery formula so that plaintiffs'
attorneys will receive greater portions of the recovery as the
recovery exceeds certain benchmarks.94 This type of formula
could be designed to prevent windfalls by limiting the maximum
percentage recovery to forty percent which will still provide
attorneys with incentives to achieve the greatest recovery possible
for the class.95
Critics also contend that in contrast to the purported beneficial
reduction in the percentage of attorneys' fee awards caused by using
auctions, "[nion-auction cases have also resulted in fee awards
below traditional benchmarks ... and auctions do not guarantee
reasonable fees."96 The most often cited illustration of auctions not
guaranteeing reasonable fees involves the fee award in In re
Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation.97 The district court overrode
the contractual fee agreement that the class counsel and lead
plaintiff had negotiated as part of the settlement agreement.
Instead, the court approved a $262 million fee award using the fee
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Class Action Lawsuits: Examining Victim Compensation and Attorneys' Fees:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 30 (1997) (statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb). Professor
Coffee also "served as legal consultant and adviser to the White House's Office of General
Counsel during the PSLRA's consideration and passage...." Robbins & Burnside, supra note
80, at 350-51.
94. Coffee, supra note 85.
95. Id.
96. Skupien & McSherry, supra note 27, at 8.
97. 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000).
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formula that it determined during the auction for lead counsel.9"
This award exceeded the fee amount that the parties had negotiated
by $76 million, and the award constituted about 8.4% of the settle-
ment.99
The result in Cendant Corp. supports the argument that fee
awards established by the courts during the auction conducted at
the beginning of litigation should be reviewed for reasonableness
after the parties reach a settlement agreement. Many judges assert
that this is especially true for securities class actions because the
PSLRA instructs courts to ensure that "[t]otal attorneys' fees and
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall
not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages
and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.""° In perhaps
the most detailed analysis of the issue, Judge Ellis explained in In
re Microstrategy Inc. Securities Litigation'0 ' that the fee amount
should not be finalized through an auction.
The ultimate fee structure is within a district court's control
throughout the litigation, because, at the conclusion of the
litigation, a district court has a statutory obligation to ensure
that the ultimate award of attorney's fees is reasonable....
Instead, a district court should approve plaintiffs choice of lead
counsel based solely on that counsel's competence, experience,
and resources, saving the question of fees until the conclusion of
the litigation."°
Professor Coffee has recommended a compromise position with
respect to auctions and attorneys' fee awards. He suggests that
auctions clearly generate useful information about the actual
market rates for various levels of risk."3 Courts, therefore, should
98. John C. Coffee, Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, 225 N.Y. L.J., May 17, 2001, at 5;
Kranhold & Schmitt, supra note 70.
99. Kranhold & Schmitt, supra note 70.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(aX6) (2000). The conference report to the PSLRA also encourages
expost review of fee awards because it expressly states that "[bly not fixing the percentage
of fees and costs counsel may receive, the Conference Committee intends to give the court
flexibility in determining what is reasonable on a case-by-case basis." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-369, at 36 (1995).
101. 110 F. Supp. 2d. 427 (E.D. Va. 2000).
102. Id. at 438 (citation omitted).
103. Coffee, supra note 98.
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conduct auctions regarding attorney fees at the outset of litigation
and use the information to generate presumptive fee formulas
that will be based on real market conditions. These market-based
formulas, Professor Coffee argues, will be superior to the arbitrary
percentages ranging from twenty-five and thirty-three percent that
judges have used over the last ten years. 1°4
Another significant problem with auctions involves comparing
bids that use different formulas and tactics. For example, in Wells
Fargo 1105 one of the firms offered to absorb all of its litigation
expenses in exchange for higher fee percentages;'06 whereas "[t]he
winning bidder proposed to deduct its litigation expenses from
the total amount of any recovery before application of its fee per-
centage."'0 7 Another problem involves comparing a flat percentage
fee formula with either a declining-percentage-of-the-recovery
formula or an increasing-percentage-of-the-recovery formula.
Professor Coffee notes that for judges to compare the different
formulas, they must make a prediction about the likely settlement
value of the case, thereby causing them to compromise the court's
neutrality. 108
In general, the majority of commentators have not approved of
the auction method for selecting class counsel. The Third Circuit
Task Force charged with evaluating the use of auctions strongly
recommended against it.'09 The Task Force concluded that auctions
fail to replicate the private market for legal services because they
do not adequately account for factors other than price, such as
"reputation, experience, firm resources, particularized competence,
prior track record in similar matters, personal qualities, pre-
existing lawyer-client relationship, relationship of counsel to other
parties and their lawyers, and commitment to a prompt resolution
of [the] matter" that play an important role in selecting counsel."0
C. Lead Plaintiff Provision of the PSLRA
104. Id.
105. Wells Fargo 11, 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
106. Sachnoff & Gilbert, supra note 67, at 542.
107. Id.
108. Coffee, supra note 85.
109. THIRD CIRCuIT TASK FoRcE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
110. Id.
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In response to growing discontent with traditional methods of
appointing lead counsel, who in turn would recruit lead plaintiffs,
Congress enacted the PSLRA"' in 1995 to reform securities class
action lawsuits. 2 The goal of the PSLRA was to encourage
institutional investors to play a more active role in securities class
action litigation by monitoring class counsel."11 Congress hoped that
closer monitoring would increase the probability of obtaining better
settlement outcomes in the interests of the class members and that
it would reduce the number of frivolous securities class actions. 114
To accomplish this, as part of the PSLRA, Congress developed the
lead plaintiff provision which allows the lead plaintiff to "select and
retain counsel to represent the class."" 5 The statute stipulates
procedures for the court to adopt in selecting the lead plaintiff who
is the "most capable of adequately representing the interests of
class members.""' The court is to presume that the most adequate
plaintiff is the one who has the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class.'17 A member of the purported plaintiff
class is the only person who may rebut the presumption by showing
that the presumed most adequate plaintiff "will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class,"' or is "subject to
unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately
representing the class."" 9 It is clear, therefore, that the PSLRA
shifts the court's focus from the selection of lead counsel to the
selection of a lead plaintiff who will assume the court's traditional
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(aX3) (2000).
112. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8-10 (1995).
113. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (emphasizing that the Act is "intended to
increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are
more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and
exercise control over the selection and actions of plaintiffs counsel").
114. Id. at 34 (explaining that Congress wanted to encourage institutional investors to
take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits which would "ultimately benefit
shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of representation").'
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(aX3XBXv).
116. Id. § 78-u4(aX3XBXi).
117. Id. § 78-u4(aX3XBXiiiXXbb) ("The court shall adopt a presumption that the most
adequate plaintiff... is the person or group of persons that ... in the determination of the
court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class.").
118. Id. § 78-u4(aX3XBXiiiXIIXaa).
119. Id. § 78-u4(a)(3XBXiiiXIIXbb).
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role of monitoring lead counsel and negotiating the attorney's fee. 120
In other words, the PSLRA advances the "client-driven" model of
class action. 2 1
1. The Lead Plaintiff as a Trustworthy Monitor
The reason courts have not historically focused their resources on
appointing an adequate lead plaintiff instead of lead counsel is due
to economic incentives. "[Tihe small size of ... individual claims
creates enormous free-rider effects: no rational plaintiff would take
on the role of litigation monitor because she would incur all the
costs of doing so but would realize only her pro rata share of the
benefits."'22 Professors Weiss and Beckerman, however, were able
to convince Congress that institutional investors in securities class
actions are more capable than typical figurehead plaintiffs at
effectively monitoring lead counsel because (1) they have large
financial stakes in the outcome of the litigation, and (2) they have,
or could readily develop, the necessary expertise to determine
whether "plaintiffs' attorneys are acting as faithful champions for
the plaintiff class."123 They determined that serving as lead plaintiff
would put institutional investors in "the most advantageous
position" to monitor lead counsel. 12' This is because as lead plaintiff,
the institutional investor could appoint his attorney to serve as lead
counsel, as opposed to being a passive member of the class where
he would have to hire and pay another attorney to challenge a
settlement after it had already been reached.' Because courts are
rarely receptive to objectors' claims and frequently force them to
bear their own attorneys' fees, an institutional investor who is just
120. "[The PSLRA is intended to empower investors so that they, not their lawyers,
control securities litigation." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (emphasis omitted). Senator
Christopher Dodd, drafter and sponsor of the PSLRA, further emphasized Congress'
intention by asserting that the conference report should convey investor control by giving
them the authority to select class counsel: "[Tihe conference report empowers investors so
that they ... have the greater control over the class action cases by allowing plaintiffs with
the greatest claim to be named plaintiff and allowing that plaintiff to select their counsel."
141 CONG. REc. S17,956 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
121. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 75.
122. Macey & Miller, supra note 52, at 20.
123. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2095.
124. Id. at 2096.
125. Id.
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another member of the class faces huge disincentives to become
more active in monitoring lead counsel by challenging settlement
agreements.126 In contrast, the institutional investor-acting as lead
plaintiff--could monitor settlement negotiations as they are made,
thus saving the expense of challenging the agreement after it has
already been reached.
2. Institutional Investors as Lead Plaintiffs
The success of the PSLRA in encouraging institutional investors
to become more active in securities class actions by assuming the
role of lead plaintiff and monitoring lead counsel is still somewhat
unclear. It appears, however, that institutional investors are be-
ginning to take a more active role, as illustrated by the University
of California's role as lead plaintiff in the much publicized class
action suit against Enron,'27 despite early reports that institutions
continued to remain "on the sidelines.""2 Two years after the
PSLRA was enacted, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) conducted research revealing two primary reasons why
institutional investors are reluctant to serve as lead plaintiffs: (1)
institutions are concerned that acting as lead plaintiff "could expose
them to liability to other class members 129 and (2) institutions
obtain higher returns by bringing their own individual suits.30 At
least the second phenomenon is still occurring among institutional
investors because investors feel that they can present a stronger
individual claim than class members can establish in a class
action.'"'
126. Id. at 2104.
127. Jerry Hirsch, UC Named Lead Plaintiff in Enron Class-Action Suit, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2002, at C8 ("Enron's stock collapse cost the university system $145 million in pension
and endowment funds it had invested in the company.").
128. Implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 20 (1997) (statement of Hon. Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
129. Id. at 21 (statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) ("For example, other
class members could sue the lead plaintiff if the terms of the settlement were claimed to be
inadequate.-).
130. Id.
131. Dan Bailey, Emergence of lnstitutional Investors as Plaintiffs, reprinted from 36 THE
ACE REPoRT, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.arterhadden.com/publications.
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Past reluctance, however, may be diminishing as new evidence
shows that the benefits institutional investors receive from being
lead plaintiffs is greater than they initially predicted. Recently, for
example, in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation,"3 2 two institutional
investors served as lead plaintiffs and secured a $3.1 billion
settlement. 3 3 Evidence further shows that the "average post-
Reform Act settlement is $17.5 million, compared to just $5 million
before [the PSLRA was enacted]-a 300% increase."13' The large
beneficial impact institutional investors are having on settlement
recoveries appears to be reversing the tide of passivity.
In addition to the financial incentives for monitoring lead
counsel, Professors Weiss and Beckerman also think that the
expertise of institutional investors who serve as lead plaintiffs can
be an important factor in effective monitoring. Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit recently held that the PSLRA raises the standard Rule 23(a)
adequacy threshold." 5 The court held that the PSLRA requires
132. 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998).
133. 264 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Coffee, supra note 98. Cendent Corporation was
formed by a merger of CUC International and HFS, Inc. In '1998, a suit was initiated on
behalf ofCendant Corporation's shareholders afterthe company discovered thatpredecessor
CUC's financial statements for 1997 contained irregularities. The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey appointed a lead plaintiff to "pursue claims involving
income and growth PRIDES derivative securities based on Cendant common stock." Bids for
Cendant Class Counsel Must be Unsealed, 16 ANDREWs CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG.
REP. 11 (2001). CaPERS and the New York Common Fund served as the lead plaintiffs.
Lerach, supra note 20. Judge William Walls used the auction method to select lead counsel.
On March 18, 1999, the court gave preliminary approval to a proposed settlement of the case
worth about $341.5 million. Bids for Cendant Class Counsel Must be Unsealed, supra, at 11.
134. Lerach, supra note 20.
135. Bergerv. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2001). Michael Brown,
one of several class members, sued Compaq Computer Corporation for allegedly artificially
inflating its stock price by engaging in 'channel stuffing" ("overselling products to
distributors with the knowledge that the distributors would not be able to resell the products
to end users"). Miranda S. Schiller & Haron W. Murage, Securities Fraud Plaintiffs Bear a
Heavier Burden of Demonstrating That They Can Adequately Represent a Class after the
Reform Act, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2001, at 8. The district court appointed four
plaintiffs to serve as lead plaintiffs who then moved for class certification. Compaq opposed
class certification on the grounds that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they were
controlling the litigation. Id. To support their claim, defendants noted that Michael Brown
and other deposed lead plaintiffs, were unable to factually support their allegation that
Compaq's former chief executive knowingly misstated revenue targets. Jerry Markon, Ruling
Affects Lawsuits Filed by Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29,2001, at C1. The district court,
however, granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and appointed the four lead
plaintiffs who had appeared for depositions as class representatives. Compaq, pursuant to
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"that securities class actions be managed by active, able class
representatives who are informed and can demonstrate they are
directing the litigation.""3 6 It determined that the correct legal
standard is to determine whether lead plaintiffs will "take an active
role in and control the litigation""3 7 and demonstrate that they
"know more than that they were 'involved in a bad business
deal."" 8 The court summed up the purpose of ensuring that lead
plaintiffs are better informed and have more expertise with the
following: "Class action lawsuits are intended to serve as a vehicle
for capable, committed advocates to pursue the goals of the class
members through counsel, not for capable, committed counsel to
pursue their own goals though those class members."' 9 After its
emphatic insistence on informed lead plaintiffs controlling the
litigation, the court completely vacated the class certification and
remanded the case, sending a clear message that it will closely
scrutinize the capacity of lead plaintiffs to control securities class
actions now and in the future.
140
The greatest strength of the PSLRA in terms of providing
incentives to institutional investors for assuming the role of lead
plaintiff is its provision allowing these investors to appoint lead
counsel. This provision encourages institutional investors to play a
more active role because it affords them the opportunity to work
with counsel with whom they are familiar.'" Representatives of
Rule 23(f), sought interlocutory appellate review of the certification decision which the
federal appeals court in New Orleans granted. Schiller & Murage, supra. The court's ruling
sent a message to plaintiffs' attorneys that their clients must understand the case and cannot
merely serve as class figureheads. Indeed, the court set a higher standard that demands that
the class members have enough knowledge to direct the litigation. Markon, supra.
Specifically, the court held that courts commit reversible error when they (1) "invert[] the
requirement that the party seeking certification bears the burden of proving all elements of
Rule 23(a)," and (2) 'effectively abdicate(0-to a self-interested party-the court's duty to
ensure that the due process rights of the absent class members are safeguarded." Berger, 257
F.3d at 482.
136. Berger, 257 F.3d at 483.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Kelley v. Mid-America Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 410 (W.D.
Okla. 1990)).
139. Id. at 484.
140. Id.; Markon, supra note 135.
141. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission, In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000) (Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653) (discussing how
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institutional investors who testified before the Third Circuit Task
Force claimed that "shotgun marriages" of plaintiff with counsel
whom it did not choose discourages prospective plaintiffs because
they will have to take into account the risks of being "deprived of
their choice of counsel or their preferred fee arrangement."'42
Congress intended for the court to disturb the lead plaintiff's choice
of counsel only if it appears "necessary to protect the interests of
the plaintiff class."" The SEC supports, at maximum, a "floating
test" in those rare circumstances where the court may need to
exercise greater scrutiny of the lead plaintiff's choice for counsel.
"Greater scrutiny is warranted where it appears that the lead
plaintiff has not played an active, effective role in choosing
counsel."144 The SEC, however, urges the courts to trust the judg-
ment of a lead plaintiff who "possesses the qualities and acts in the
manner contemplated by Congress" because "failing to do so could
enhance counsel's control of the litigation, which is contrary to
Congress' intent" and could also "deprive institutional investors of
a core reason for serving as lead plaintiff.""4 5
III. EXTENDING THE PSLRA TO OTHER TYPES OF CLASS AcTION
LITIGATION
A Successful Elements of Lead Plaintiff Provision in Securities
Class Actions
The success of the lead plaintiff provision in monitoring lead
counsel and ensuring better settlement outcomes supports argu-
institutional investors "may find it difficult to workwith [sic] unfamiliar counsel and thus
may play a less active and effective role on behalf of the class"), available at
http:/www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/cendnt.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
142. THIRD CERcurr TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 56.
143. Barry M. Kaplan & Leigh S. Kilcline, Recent Developments in the Appointment of
Lead Plaintiffs, Lead Counsel and Class Certification, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 408
(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1136,1999); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78-u(4)(aX3)(B)(iiiXlIXaa) (2000).
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 140; Brief
of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 23, Moore v. Network Assocs.,
Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-70006), available at http'J/www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs.
netwkbr2.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 141.
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ments for extending the provision to other damages class action
litigation. The feasability of such an extension, however, requires
considering the various unique aspects of securities class actions
and their role in the PSLRA's success.
Shareholders bring most securities class actions claiming
damages against a company for fraudulently affecting or mis-
representing their stock price. All of the shareholders suffer the
same type of damage, although to varying degrees depending on the
amount of shares they own. Because damages can be so objectively
and fairly quantified, "an automatic allocation formula exists,
thereby usually reducing intra-class tensions."1
Lack of class tensions is important because conflicts among class
members and between class members and their representatives
(lead counsel and plaintiff) are the biggest obstacles to effective
class representation.147 Internal conflicts, for example, can impede
the ability of lead counsel to represent the entire class if factions
within the class are fighting over allocation of the settlement.14 If
some class members have more at stake than others, they may be
more risk-averse and more eager to accept a settlement than those
who have less at stake and prefer to risk going to trial.149 This can
significantly impair the lead plaintiffs ability to protect the best
interests of the class if it is willing to tolerate less risk. Even more,
lead counsel themselves may be biased by their own risk-aversions
resulting from significant opportunity costs created by the amount
146. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 384 (2000).
147. Cf id. at 385-93. These risks include:
(1) internal conflicts that exist within the class--typically, because
subcategories of class members are competing over the allocation of the
settlement; (2) external conflicts that arise because class members (or their
attorneys) have some extraneous reason for favoring a settlement that does not
truly benefit the interests of all class members; (3) risk conflicts that arise
because class members or class counsel have very different attitudes about the
level of risk they are willing to bear, and (4) conflicts over control of the
litigation.
Idc. at 386.
148. Id. at 386-88 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997)).
149. Id. at 389-90.
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of time and financial resources they have invested in bringing the
lawsuit.1'°
Fortunately, in securities class actions, many of these conflicts
are not present or have minimal impact. The fact that class mem-
bers suffer the same type of damages reduces fighting about the
allocation of the settlement because of the innate and objective
allocation formula discussed earlier.' 5' There is a difference in the
level of risk that the lead plaintiff is willing to tolerate compared to
the class members because the lead plaintiff under the PSLRA is
usually the investor who has the largest financial stake in the
litigation.5 2 The number of large institutional investors who choose
to opt out of class action suits and bring individual suits separate
from the class is evidence of this.15 Given the recent success of
institutional investors in securing large settlements in class actions
suits, however, it appears that this disparity in risk tolerance is not
a significant obstacle.' 5 Finally, the ability of a lead plaintiff to
choose lead counsel in a securities class action under the PSLRA
moderates lead counsel's risk preferences by keeping the pref-
erences of the class in the forefront and forcing lead counsel to
consider them in addition to his own desires.
Another challenge that securities class actions are able to
overcome by their very nature is the influence that an institutional
investor as lead plaintiff is able to exert. Simply because the lead
plaintiff is allowed to appoint lead counsel does not mean that lead
counsel will abide by the lead plaintiffs wishes. Indeed, lead
counsel easily could argue that once appointed, her job is to serve
the best interests of the class and not solely the interests of the lead
plaintiff. She could, therefore, override the lead plaintiff's desires
in settlement negotiations by justifying her actions in the name of
serving the class. The PSLRA does not secure the lead plaintiffs
influence over the appointed counsel. In fact, "It]he PSLRA is silent
as to whether the lead plaintiff has any ability to dismiss the
150. Id. at 390-91.
151. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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counsel it retains" if a conflict develops.'55 The most important
source of influence for institutional investors is the likelihood that,
because they hold so many securities, they will have the oppor-
tunity to repeatedly serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class
actions and select counsel in the future. Reputation, therefore, is an
extremely powerful enforcement device in securities class actions,
forcing the lead counsel to consider the lead plaintiffs opinions and
desires.
Finally, perhaps the most obvious aspect of securities class
actions playing a role in the success of the PSLRA is that the
institutional investor with the largest financial stake in the
litigation is presumed to be, and usually is, the most adequate lead
plaintiff.' Choosing the institutional investor with the largest
financial stake as lead plaintiff is easy for the court, thereby
reducing the drain on resources, and generally resulting in the most
sophisticated member of the class becoming lead plaintiff.157
Furthermore, institutional investors have adequate financial
resources with which to monitor the litigation and lead counsel.1 5
In other class actions, determining the most sophisticated plaintiff
who has the expertise, motivation, and financial resources to
monitor the lead counsel may not be as easy to objectively deter-
mine.
In summary, several major factors have made the lead plaintiff
provision successful in securities class actions: (1) the plaintiffs
homogenous damages that can be fairly and objectively allocated in
a settlement agreement, (2) the probability of repeat performances
by institutional investors as lead plaintiffs, which increases their
influence over lead counsel, and (3) an objective factor, the size of
155. Coffee, supra note 146, at 414 (stating that the only section in the PSLRA detailing
the powers of the lead plaintiff is § 78u.4(aX3XB)(v) which mandates that the lead plaintiff
select and retain counsel to represent the class subject to the approval of the court); see also
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(aX3XB)(v) (2000). This is the only section that describes the function of the
lead plaintiff. The PSLRA, therefore, does not address whether the lead plaintiff has the
power to replace counsel it retains. Legislative history is also silent on this issue.
156. See supra notes 117, 123-25, 135-40 and accompanying text.
157. Institutional investors have greater incentives to be knowledgeable about the facts
and play a more active role in the litigation than noninstitutional class members. See supra
notes 123-25, 1320-34, 135-42 and accompanying text.
158. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2095.
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the investor's financial stake, that a court can use in accurately
determining the most adequate plaintiff in terms of both
sophistication and financial resources.
B. Extending the Lead Plaintiff Provision to Antitrust Class
Actions
The lead plaintiff provision could be expanded to class actions in
which (1) members of the class suffered from similar types of
damages, so that settlement allocation would only have to account
for quantitative differences, (2) the lead plaintiff has some mech-
anism available for exercising influence over lead counsel, and (3)
an objective or closely objective test could be employed to fairly and
accurately determine the most adequate plaintiff.
Antitrust class action lawsuits most closely meet the above
criteria.159 Class members have usually suffered some economic
159. Some antitrust plaintiffs such as indirect purchasers, most of whom are consumers,
are not permitted to bring an antitrust action for damages in federal court. Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,745-46 (1997) (holding that an indirect purchaser from an antitrust
defendant (for example, a retail consumer who purchases a product from a retail vendor, who
purchased the product from a monopolistic manufacturer) cannot bring an action for
damages against the manufacturer in federal court). Indirect purchasers, however, can bring
actions for injunctions in federal court, and several states have amended their antitrust
statutes to permit indirect purchaser lawsuits in state court such as Alabama, California,
and Minnesota. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 98 n.3 (1989). Such state
statutes allowing actions by indirect purchases are not preempted by federal antitrust law.
Id. at 101-02.
Reforming federal law to apply the lead plaintiff requirement to antitrust class action
lawsuits, therefore, may not benefit indirect purchasers who are unable to bring an antitrust
class action seeking damages in federal court. The reality, however, is that despite the
prohibition against indirect purchaser claims in federal court, the majority of antitrust
enforcement comes from lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs in federal court. HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 278 (Black Letter Series, 3d ed. 1999). In the year 2000, for
example, antitrust class actions comprised 8.9% of all federal class actions. 2001 Federal
Court Class Action Statistics, tbl. 5: Antitrust (2001), at http'/classactionreports.com/
classactionreportststats5.htm [hereinafter 2001 Federal Court Class Action Statistics).
Applying the lead plaintiff provision to only federal law, therefore, would still have a
substantial reform impact on antitrust class action litigation.
Indeed, the lead plaintiff provision could enjoy even more widespread success if state
legislatures also adopt the provision and thereby apply the reform to antitrust class actions
brought by indirect purchasers in state courts. Whether the provision is adopted only at the
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loss due to collusion or other monopolistic activity that results in
higher prices to the consumer. Therefore, all class members will
suffer the same type of damages (economic loss) with the only
differences being the amount of loss each class member suffered.
This quantitative difference creates a simple method for allocation
of the recovery and an objective method for determining who should
be the lead plaintiff-presumably the class member who has
suffered the greatest loss.
The largest antitrust class action lawsuit brought against the
airlines in the past decade illustrates how the lead plaintiff
provision of the PSLRA could have prevented a settlement that
outrageously favored class attorneys at the expense of class mem-
bers."s° Four airlines were accused of violating federal antitrust
laws by colluding to fix prices through an elaborate scheme in
which they "conducted complex negotiations, offered explanations,
traded concessions with one another, took actions against their
independent self-interests, punished recalcitrant airlines that
discounted fares and exchanged commitments and assurances, all
to the end of reaching agreements to increase fares, eliminate
discounts and set fare restrictions." 16 ' The suit's class included
people who flew on any of the named airlines between January 1,
1988 and August 7, 1991, and who flew through one of twenty-three
hubs of operation.16 2 The airlines agreed to settle the charges of
illegally setting ticket prices by paying $44 million in cash and
$368.5 million in discount fare coupons. 6
federal level or also by state legislatures, it will be a useful reform measure to plaintiffs
pursuing antitrust class actions for damages.
160. ClassAction Lawsuits: Examining Victim Compensation andAttorneys' Fees: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1998) [hereinafter Judiciary Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (questioning "these types of unfair settlements as
well as their causes'); Joe Davidson, Airlines Charged with Scheme to Raise Fares: Justice
DepartmentAlleges 8Firms Swapped Data; 2 File Consent Decree, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,1992,
at A3; see also Northwest Air, TWA Move Toward Settling Price.Fixing Lawsuit, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 20, 1991, at A14; Brett Pulley & Bridget OBrian, More Airlines to Settle Suit on
Price-Fixing, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A3.
161. Davidson, supra note 160 (quoting the Justice Department's charge against the
airlines).
162. Northwest Air, TWA Move Toward Settling Price-Fixing Lawsuit, supra note 160.
163. Pulley & O'Brian, supra note 160.
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Although on its face the settlement appeared generous, in reality
it cost the class members more than they gained and meanwhile
provided their attorneys with $16 million in fees and expenses.'"
Fliers who received the discount coupons had to purchase tickets in
order to use the coupon and thereby benefit from the settlement. 6 '
For example, "a $10 certificate [could] only be used to purchase a
roundtrip ticket costing $50 or more" forcing the plaintiff "to spend
at least $40 of his or her own money to get benefits worth $10."'6
The maximum recovery allowable to an individual class member
was $150 worth of certificates that could be used to purchase a
roundtrip ticket of $1,500 or more.1 67 The cash portion of the
settlement, on the other hand, was "spent on administrative
expenses surrounding these coupons ... given to charities, and ...
went for attorneys' fees .... "168
A lead plaintiff charged with representing the class interests in
this case would have prevented the egregious disparity between
class member and attorney recovery. Analogizing to the PSLRA, the
lead plaintiff for this case would presumably have been the class
member who had spent the most on airline tickets between January
1, 1988 and August 7, 1991. Interestingly enough, similar to the
institutional investors in securities class actions, this class member
would likely have been an "institution," a travel agency or other
business engaged in the travel industry. Thus, such a corporate
lead plaintiff could exert substantial influence over the settlement
amount because they regularly do business with the airlines and
because of their potential to serve as repeat plaintiffs in future class
actions against airlines. Due to the potentially large amount of
economic loss that this one individual class member or institution
could have sustained, such a lead plaintiff has great incentives to
monitor the lead counsel and any settlement negotiations to ensure
that the recovery amount will cure the losses the class sustained.
Certainly if there had been a lead plaintiff, the lead counsel would
never have been able to agree to a settlement that would force class
164. Judiciary Hearings, supra note 160, at 2 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
165. Pulley & O'Brian, supra note 160.
166. Judiciary Hearings, supra note 160, at 2 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
167. Id. (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
168. Id. (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
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members to pay even more money to the airlines in order to recover
their previous economic loss!
C. Adapting the Lead Plaintiff Provision to Other Class Actions
Extending the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA to class
action lawsuits other than those involving antitrust or securities
claims requires the court to discover and appoint the plaintiff who
most closely resembles the securities class action institutional
investor. Because a class member's financial stake in the litigation
is a factor unique to securities (and possibly antitrust) class actions,
the court will have to consider more than this one objective
characteristic. The Third Circuit Task Force suggested that in
determining whether the lead plaintiff possesses the requisite
experience and incentive to monitor counsel and negotiate a
reasonable fee, the court should focus on the relationship between
the prospective counsel and plaintiff to determine:
(1) whether the party has exercised control over the litigation to
date; (2) whether the party has experience in managing
litigation; (3) whether the party has experience in acting as a
fiduciary; (4) any pre-existing lawyer-client relationship,
including in prior class actions; and (5) whether the party has
the financial resources and time to commit to managing the
litigation. 169
These recommendations, however, introduce an element of sub-
jectivity that could create problems similar to those associated with
traditional judicial selection of lead counsel.'70 In order for the lead
plaintiff provision to work effectively, the lead plaintiff must be able
to exert influence over the lead counsel. Most class actions outside
of securities litigation do not involve repeat players such as
169. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 94-95 (citing testimony
of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest) (footnote omitted).
170. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
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institutional investors. It is unlikely, therefore, that the lead
counsel's interest in preserving his or her reputation will be a
powerful tool for lead plaintiffs. A substitute tool might be for the
lead plaintiff and counsel to enter into a contractual agreement.
Such an agreement might allow class representatives to replace
lead counsel in the event of a disagreement over the adequacy of the
settlement; the original lead counsel would "then be entitled to
immediate repayment of the litigation expenses... and to eventual
payment of a reasonable contingent fee based on the originally
proposed settlement." 7' The disadvantage to such a contract,
however, is that the dismissed counsel would be forced to rely on
the successor counsel to negotiate a large enough settlement to
cover his contingency fee, the successor's contingency fee, and a
reasonable recovery for the class members.'72 This disadvantage,
however, should not severely affect the applicability of the lead
plaintiff provision to other class actions for two reasons: (1) the lead
plaintiff and counsel may be able to reach a contractual agreement
that, while it may not as fairly balance their interests, will not
suffer from such heavy financial pressures, and (2) such a contract,
despite its onerous disadvantage (maybe even because of it), may be
just as powerful of a tool as reputation in deterring lead counsel
from ignoring the lead plaintiffs desires.
D. Lead Plaintiff Provision is a Superior Alternative to Other
Reform Proposals
Although the increased subjectiveness of selecting the lead
plaintiff and the need for contractual arrangements between the
lead plaintiff and counsel may weaken the effectiveness of the lead
plaintiff provision in other class action suits, it still remains a
better alternative to traditional lead counsel appointment methods
and auctions.
In class actions in which a member of the class has the
motivation, expertise, and financial resources to monitor lead
counsel, the lead plaintiff provision is a superior alternative to
traditional methods of appointing lead counsel for several reasons.
171. Coffee, supra note 146, at 411-12.
172. Cf id. at 412.
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First, it is more effective for the lead plaintiff to challenge
settlement terms on behalf of class members as they are made
rather than leaving the entire class to oppose the settlement
agreement ex post when their objections are likely to be ignored by
the judge.""3 Second, lead plaintiffs are better advocates of class
interests than judges because they have access to information that
judges lack. This enables them to more adequately evaluate
settlement agreements.' 7 4 Finally, allowing lead plaintiffs to
monitor lead counsel preserves vital court resources that would
have to be employed to obtain the same amount of effective
representation. 1
75
The lead plaintiff provision is also more effective than auctions.
First, lead plaintiffs consider more than price in selecting lead
counsel 176 and, therefore, are better able to simulate the process
that clients in normal litigation use in selecting their counsel. By
using the lead plaintiff provision, the class will also be able to
obtain one of the benefits of the auction method, namely expeditious
settlement, without sacrificing quality representation. 77 Second,
the lead plaintiff provision avoids the problem of "shotgun
marriages" that shift control back to the lead counsel. 78 Third, in
contrast to the disincentives auctions create for class counsel to
investigate and pursue claims, the lead plaintiff provision ensures
that attorneys will still be able to recover their fees and thereby
preserves their willingness to participate in and discover class
action claims. Indeed, the lead plaintiff provision creates an
incentive for quality firms to develop relationships with recurring
lead plaintiffs, analogous to institutional investors in securities
class actions, because it increases their chances of being selected to
serve as lead counsel in future litigation. The lead counsel's interest
in preserving this relationship also fosters more reasonable fee
awards and a better overall settlement award for the class than the
auction method, especially if the auction awarded the bid to a firm
173. See supra notes 37, 52-56, and accompanying text.
174. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 8, at 2095.
175. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
176. Fisch, supra note 7, at 53, 83.
177. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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restricted by fee caps. 179 Finally, the lead plaintiff provision is more
efficient than conducting an auction for the purpose of selecting
lead counsel because it eliminates the time, costs, and difficulties
associated with collecting bids and comparing them.i"0
E. Types of Class Actions in Which the Lead Plaintiff Provision
Cannot be Successfully Employed
The primary obstacle to applying the lead plaintiff provision to
other class actions is not whether it will be more effective than
other alternatives, but whether it is a practical alternative.
Effectively applying the lead plaintiff provision to other class
actions requires the class action to contain (1) members who have
suffered similar damages, and (2) motivated members who have the
financial resources to monitor lead counsel. These requirements
significantly limit the class action landscape to which PSLRA-like
reform is applicable.8 ' At one extreme, many class actions are
comprised of a large number of claimants with small losses. 18 2 In
these small claim class actions it is highly unlikely that any
member will be willing to outlay the necessary time and financial
resources to monitor lead counsel because such monitoring will
either cost more than the loss or the actual loss will not be large
enough to motivate any one class member to monitor the lead
counsel.'83
At the other extreme, according to the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 10.7% of all class action suits filed in
1998 involved mass tort litigation.8 4 Mass tort class actions are
179. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (explaining how fee caps create
disincentives for the winning bidder to maximize recovery for the class).
180. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
181. Class action lawsuits by class members seeking homogenous damages comprised only
22.7% of class action lawsuits filed and 52.1% of pending class actions between 1973 and
2001. The two types of class actions containing class members with homogenous
damages-securities and antitrust class actions-comprise 13.4% and 5.2% (respectively) of
the total number of class actions filed between 1973 and 1998. 2001 Federal Court Class
Action Statistics, tbl. 1: Federal Court Class Actions by Type (citing statistics reported by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
182. THURD CIRCUrr TASK FoRcE FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 95.
183. See Coffee, supra note 146, at 412 (discussing the collective action problem).
184. 2001 Federal Court ClassAction Statistics, tbl. 8: Tort (listing the yearly percentages
of tort class actions between 1972 and 2001).
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significantly different from other class actions in that individual
members suffer diverse injuries and damages. This diversity makes
intra-class conflict more likely and makes it virtually impossible for
one class member to effectively represent the entire class.'85 The
lead plaintiff provision, therefore, is probably not suitable for class
actions in which one of the elements-either homogenous damages
or members who have the financial resources to monitor lead
counsel-is absent, such as mass tort and small claim class actions.
The lead counsel provision will be most effective when both
elements are present; its effectiveness will correlate to the degree
that each of the elements are satisfied. A class action, for example,
which has a willing and able lead plaintiff but which also has slight
differences among class members with respect to the substance and
size of damages, might still be able to effectively utilize the lead
plaintiff provision to monitor lead counsel. Such minor differences
will most likely not be great enough to overpower the lead plaintiff
and counsel's ability to fairly allocate the settlement.
Some class actions involving employment discrimination
exemplify this scenario. In these suits, employees and/or employee
applicants ban together to allege that they suffered similar
damages from an employer's alleged policy of intentional dis-
crimination. In 1998, employment class action filings comprised
31.2% of all civil rights class actions which comprised 14.1% of all
class actions. 186Two recent cases illustrate this type of class action
involving employment discrimination: Smith v. Texaco, Inc. 8 and
Osgood v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.' In Smith, the named
plaintiffs, representing a class of approximately two hundred other
salaried black employees, asserted that their employer, Texaco,
and its subsidiary, Star, discriminated in giving "promotions,
compensation, and other benefits and privileges of employment."
18 9
The plaintiffs sought "monetary damages including.., compensatory
185. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
186. See 2001 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, tbl. 6: Civil Rights (depicting statistics
reported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and showing in
parenthesis the number of civil rights class actions involving employment discrimination
though not specifying the number of employment discrimination class actions that sought
monetary relief (Rule 23(bX3) class action) as opposed to injunctive relief (Rule 23(bX2))).
187. 263 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001), vacated, 281 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002).
188. 202 F.R.D. 115 (D.N.J. 2001).
189. Smith, 263 F.3d at 403.
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and punitive damages."' Likewise, Mary Osgood, a caucasian
female, brought an individual and class action suit against her
employer, a casino, for discriminating by "deny[ing] [ employment
opportunities such as job positions, promotions, potential for
advancement and management training on the basis of the race of
the applicant or employee."'91 As did the class plaintiffs in Smith,
Osgood sought monetary relief.92
The damages suffered in each case were identical in the sense
that the employer discriminated against the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs suffered different damages, however, in the manner in
which the employer discriminated against them, such as through
hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting their employees. The
damages among class members also differed with respect to the
amount that would fairly compensate each individual for emotional
and other intangible injuries.
Despite these differences, the lead plaintiff provision could be an
effective tool for the plaintiff classes because all of them suffered
damages from discrimination and pursued compensation for
emotional or intangible harm. Because the law focuses more on the
degree to which the employer discriminates and the amount of
harm it causes to the employee than on the way in which the
employer discriminates, it is very unlikely that intra-class conflict
will arise between class members because the employer
discriminated against them differently. Moreover, because lead
plaintiffs have suffered the same injury as their class members, the
only obstacle with respect to damages will be allocating the damage
award to reflect the degree to which each member suffered. This is
very similar to the scenario a lead plaintiff faces in a securities
class action; the only difference being that a securities damage
award is objectively allocated based on the amount of securities
each member owns in contrast to a damage award from an
employee-discrimination class action which must be allocated on a
subjective compensatory basis. Employee discrimination class
actions, therefore, would be a good candidate for the lead plaintiff
provision because the damages are relatively homogenous and given
190. Id.
191. Osgood, 202 F.R.D. at 123 (citations omitted) (quoting the plaintiffs brief).
192. Id. at 117.
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the emotional nature of the claim, it is likely that a class member
will be willing to serve as lead plaintiff.
There are, however, several obstacles to the success of applying
the lead plaintiff provision to such Title VII class actions that
suggest using caution before extending it to these cases. Although
the emotional nature of the claim increases the willingness of a
class member to serve as lead plaintiff, it is uncertain that the
volunteer member will possess the necessary expertise and
financial resources to adequately supervise lead counsel and protect
the interests of other class members. Additionally, because the class
members suffer almost equivalent damages, the court must select
the lead plaintiff pursuant to subjective criteria. Therefore,
although the lead plaintiff provision could improve the quality of
representation in some employment discrimination class actions, it
is not clear that it will be as effective as it will be for class actions
that more closely resemble securities litigation, such as antitrust
class actions.
IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORM SUGGESTIONS FOR CLASS ACTIONS
UNSUITABLE FOR LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION
There are other alternatives beyond judicial appointment and
auctions that could increase the probability of class members
receiving fairer settlements in class actions that are not conducive
to the lead plaintiff provision. As previously discussed, the goal of
class action reform is to implement mechanisms that will simulate
the attorney-client relationship between the lead counsel and class
members in class actions.19 The problem, however, is that lead
counsel and class members often have competing interests."19 The
source of these competing interests is partially a result of the fact
that the attorney, by financing the class action, becomes a joint
venturer who has more at stake than the individual class
members. 95 The attorney, therefore, has a lower threshold for
taking risks and seeking a larger settlement on behalf of class
193. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
195. Coffee, supra note 146, at 418.
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members.1 Professor Coffee explained the dynamics between the
different class action players as follows:
Motivated by a contingent fee, class counsel would particularly
not want to risk being replaced by a successor counsel if class
members elected to take a long-shot gamble on trial. Class
counsel's rational fear would be that after it had funded the
action for years, it might be replaced on the brink of trial and
victory, because it rationally counseled caution. Class members
in turn would fear that plaintiffs' counsel, the defendants, and
a trial court that was usually inclined to prefer settlement over
trial might conspire to strike a deal that ignored the class's ownpreferences."
Under Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2), class members must be
given notice of the action and the opportunity to opt out. 198 Because
opt-outs reduce the size of the settlement, however, lead counsel
has an incentive to set the opt-out deadline prior to the approval of
the proposed settlement.'" Currently, therefore, the only course of
action available to those who object to the settlement terms is for
them to hire an independent attorney to challenge the agreement
during the settlement hearing. As discussed previously, for a
variety of reasons these contests usually fail. 2°° Professor Coffee,
therefore, recommends delaying the opt-out deadline until after the
approval of the proposed settlement to give objectors an additional,
and perhaps more effective, course of action in expressing their
disagreement with counsel actions."1 The greatest strength of the
class is in their number; the larger the class, the greater their
chances for recovery and the higher the settlement amount. It is,
therefore, lead counsel's greatest fear that class members will
defect, upset settlement negotiations, and also reduce the likelihood
that the counsel will recover his fee.20 2 On the other hand, while
opt-outs have the opportunity to band together and bring a separate
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. Coffee, supra note 146, at 418-19 (citation omitted).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(cX2).
199. Coffee, supra note 146, at 419-20.
200. See supra notes 39, 52-56, and accompanying text.
201. Coffee, supra note 146, at 420.
202. Id. at 421.
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class action, the time and expense of doing so would act as a
sufficient deterrent to foolishly defecting. 3 Thus, increasing the
class members' opt-out power could be an extremely useful tool in
deterring lead counsel from proposing an inadequate or un-
attractive settlement.
A. Suggested Reform for Mass Tort Class Actions
Increasing class members' opt-out power would be most
applicable to mass tort class action suits. These suits are usually a
collage of members who have widely different claims with regard to
substance and size;2 4 therefore, mass tort class action litigation
remains extremely controversial.2 5 In simplistic terms, the
203. Cf id.
204. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 140.
205. The controversy stems from the tradeoff between an individual's right to have his
own day in court and the efficiencies gained by consolidating duplicative litigation into one
class action. The Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 proposal for Rule 23 recognized that
"one or more actions agreed to by the parties as test or model actions may be preferable to
a class action; or it may prove feasible and preferable to consolidate actions." Proposed Rules
of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). The notes discouraged consolidating mass tort
claims due to concern that individual issues would overwhelm the common ones. Id. For this
reason, it was not until the 1980s that courts became willing to certify mass tort class
actions. This increased willingness arose when asbestos and other mass tort litigation
including the well known Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield cases besieged the courts. Each
of these cases involved nearly 200,000 or more claimants. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort ClassAction, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (1995). Moreover,
the courts realized that these cases were amenable to aggregation because they had
significant overlapping issues such as general causation and would otherwise impose
prohibitive costs on individual litigants, also imposing significant costs on the justice system
through repetitive litigation. Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core
and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 93-94
(1997).
The increased use of mass tort litigation, however, spawned even more controversial issues
such as whether these classes should be certified under Rule 23(bX3), which would allow
class members to opt in order to pursue an individual action. The disadvantage to the opt-out
provision is that it allows class members who often have the strongest individual claims to
leave, thereby decreasing the chances of a favorable settlement for the remaining class
members (and subjecting the defendant to having to pay a settlement twice: to the remaining
class members and later to the individual litigants who opted out of the class) and also
counteracting the cost-savings gained from aggregating the claims in the first place. This
prompted some courts instead to certify the classes as mandatory Rule 23(b)(1) classes that
have no opt-out rights. Perino, supra, at 94-103. The most specific application of mandatory
class actions without opt-out rights is the limited fund doctrine that has been used when the
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controversy usually surrounds arguments that individuals suffer
such unique damages and usually could bring independent claims,
and therefore, such class actions should be prohibited. "Although
collecting such cases might be more efficient than litigating them
individually, say the critics, it will deny these individuals the right
to decide whether and when to litigate, to control the course of their
litigation, and to obtain individually crafted case outcomes." 20 6 It is
not hard to predict, therefore, that mass tort litigation classes
suffer from significant intra- and inter-class conflict that the
Supreme Court has held justify dividing the class into individually
represented subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B).2"' The major
defendant's potential tort liability exceeds the company's assets. The limited fund is a
mechanism whereby the court makes an equitable, pro rats distribution such that each
claimant would receive something less than a full recovery-but, at least each would receive
something. Id. at 98-99. Most appellate courts, however, have overturned certifications of
such mandatory mass tort class actions because they feel that they do not adequately serve
each individual's interest. Id. at 100. In recent years, the courts have once again become
increasingly skeptical about the use of mass tort class actions. The future of mass tort class
actions, even those with opt-out provisions, consequently, remains uncertain. See Castano
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,741-51 (5th Cir. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83
F.3d 610, 626-34 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-82 (6th Cir.
1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-1304 (7th Cir. 1995); Paul D.
Rheingold, Future is Uncertain for Mass Torts, Tide TurnsAway from Massive Class Actions,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 23,1998, Supplement: Litigation, at S1. Indeed, the number of mass tort class
actions filed between 1997 and 1998 decreased by 7.1%, and the number of pending class
actions fell by 16.6% during this period. 2001 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, tbl. 1:
Federal Court Class Actions by Type. For more regarding the controversy over mass tort
litigation, see HENSLERETAL., supra note 22, at 99-108; Coffee, supra, at 1343; Perino, supra,
at 90-103.
206. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 99.
207. Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4XB). Amehem Products
involved a mass tort settlement class action, which is a class action certified for the sole
purpose of settling a claim; it "is intended not to litigate contested issues but to implement
a settlement." JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SE rIEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES
19 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1998) (footnote omitted). The case involved the settlement of perhaps
millions of asbestos claims by twenty defendants. Id. at 25. In a six-to-two decision, the Court
held that the class failed to meet the Rule 23(a) certification requirements regarding
adequacy of representation and commonality of issues of fact. Amchem Products, 521 U.S.
at 622-29. The court felt that there was a significant disparity between the currently injured
and the exposure-only categories of plaintiffs and suggested that remedying this intra-class
conflict and providing adequate representation required dividing the class into subclasses.
Id. at 626-27.
Ortiz involved certifying another asbestos class settlement action, but was different from
Amchem Products because it was certified under a Rule 23(bXIXB)-or"limited fund" theory.
See supra note 205. The case involved Fireboard, a company that manufactured a variety of
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disadvantage to sub-classing an action with serious internal
conflicts is that it encourages holdouts who will opportunistically
seek a greater share of the settlement by withholding their
consent. 0 8 Coffee, therefore, recommends abandoning the re-
presentative model for class action suits when there are serious
internal conflicts and instead increasing the flexibility for opt-out
provisions.2 °9 This solution is more efficient in terms of reducing the
role of the court and letting the class members sort out their needs
for themselves by pursuing their own litigation when the class
action settlement does not meet their needs.10
Making the opt-out provision more available to class members,
however, is not any more effective than the lead plaintiff provision
at helping class members who have small individual claims. This is
because members with small claims who opt out of the litigation
may not have an independent claim strong enough to bring by
themselves; if a large number defected, they would seriously reduce
their own chances for any recovery. Small claimants also do not
have any incentive to oppose a settlement agreement that is not
as large as possible because as long as it is greater than or equal
to their loss (which is not a difficult criterion to meet for such a
small claim) they do not have an incentive to defect and incur the
products containing asbestos from the 1920s through 1971, and its insurer. The district court
certified the class under a limited fund theory, and the court of appeals affirmed after noting:
[Elven combining Fireboard's value of some $235 million with the $2 billion
provided in the Trilateral Settlement Agreement (a settlement with the
insurance company for the maximum amount of liability that the insurer would
pay], the company would be unable to pay all valid claims against it within five
to nine years.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 829 (citing In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668, 982 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Initially, the case was remanded by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of Amchem Products. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
certification of the class. The Supreme Court suggested that the applicability of Rule
23(bX1XB) to a limited fund was questionable, but more specifically reversed the court of
appeals and held the certification impermissible because the fund was limited due to a prior
settlement (i.e., subject to the defendant's own terms) rather than their true circumstances.
Id. at 864. With respect to subclassing, the majority commented on the disparate interests
between the pre-1959 claimants and the post-1959 claimants; the former group having more
valuable claims. The Court determined that the class would have to be split in order to
adequately represent these two groups and remedy the intra-class conflict. Id. at 857.
208. Coffee, supra note 146, at 435.
209. Id. at 437-39.
210. Id.
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extra expense of bringing a separate action. These factors have
historically made these types of class actions subject to the greatest
abuse by lead counsel and are therefore in the greatest need of
reform. 211
B. Suggested Reforms for Small Claim Class Actions
Unfortunately, developing better monitoring mechanisms for
small claim class litigation is very difficult. Because of the free-
rider and collective action problems that inherently plague such
actions, market mechanisms will probably fail. This is consistent
with most general free-rider problems in the economy and is usually
when government regulation is most justified. In this context,
therefore, creating a greater role for judicial review of settlement
agreements in small claim class action litigation is justified.
As discussed earlier, the reform measures the Third Circuit Task
Board and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules suggested are
inadequate to cure some of the traditional problems with entrusting
settlement review to the judiciary.212 The major problem with the
reforms is that they do not provide judges with the necessary
information to make better evaluations of settlement agreements.13
One solution might be to develop and enforce a rule or regulation
that would require the parties to file supplemental pleadings that
reveal more detailed information about each side's claim. To avoid
jeopardizing settlement negotiations, these supplemental pleadings
could be kept confidential and available only to the judge prior to
reviewing a proposed settlement.
Professor Deborah R. Hensler, Senior Fellow at RAND Institute
for Civil Justice, and Professor Thomas Rowe propose a more
radical and controversial solution. They suggest requiring the loser
of the lawsuit to pay the winner's legal expenses such that if the
plaintiff class loses, the attorneys for the class would be liable for
defendants' fees, but only up to the amount of their own reasonably
211. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1056-69 (1996) (illustrating, with a vivid example, perverse strategies attorneys often
use in small claim money damages class actions).
212. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
213. Id.
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calculated fees to date.21 Likewise, if the plaintiff class wins,
defendants would pay a separate amount directly to class counsel
for class counsels' fees and expenses. This would effectively result
in courts awarding a premium to class counsel on top of the fees
and expenses they are usually awarded under the "common fund"
system.215
Requiring the loser of a lawsuit to pay the winner's fees is known
as the English Rule, and it has been widely adopted throughout the
world and consequentially, is sometimes called "the rest of the
world rule."21' Indeed, courts in Great Britain and Western Europe
have applied the rule for many years and many think that it would
vastly improve America's legal system, which generally requires
that litigants pay their own attorneys' fees regardless of the
outcome of their cases.1
Several countries, most notably Australia and Canada, have
incorporated loser-pays attorney fee shifting, as the English Rule
is sometimes called, into their class action system. In Australia, for
example, the class representative or members of the plaintiff class
who actually commenced the litigation must pay the winning
party's out-of-pocket expenses and attorneys' fees.218 This provision
has caused plaintiffs' lawyers to select a straw class representative
who has no assets from which the defendants can recover their
costs. 219 In return, defendants request courts to order the plaintiffs
to pay the court a security of the estimated costs of the
proceedings.220 Similarly, in Canada when a class loses, the
representative plaintiff is the only one liable for the defendant's
legal fees and other costs. 221 So far, representative plaintiffs have
avoided paying the costs because most cases are settled, but
214. Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond 'It Just Ain't Worth It":
Alternative Strategies for Damage ClassAction Reform, 64 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 137,152-
54 (2001).
215. Id. at 153-54.
216. Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees: Expanding the
"Loser Pays" Rule in Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1918-20 (1994).
217. Id.
218. S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A
Comparative Perspective, 11 DUE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 301 (2001).
219. Id. at 302.
220. Id.
221, Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 269, 274-75 (2001).
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analysts are concerned that the rule creates a strong disincentive
for qualified class members to serve as the class representative.222
In the early 1990s, former President Bush's Council on
Competitiveness led the civil justice reform movement and urged
the states to implement the English Rule.22 Indeed, one study
"found 1,974 fee shifting statutes in the fifty states and the District
of Columbia, "22 ' and federal law contains over two hundred statutes
that shift fees to encourage enforcing public policies such as civil
rights, consumer protection, and environmental laws.25 Alaska has
used the English Rule since the nineteenth century, and its Civil
Rule 82 "entitles the prevailing party in a civil lawsuit to partial
compensation of his or her attorney's fees from the losing party."22
The limited use of the English Rule by both federal and state law,
particularly in Alaska, shows both the advantages and dis-
advantages of applying the rule in the class action context. Martha
Pacold best explains the advantages of fee shifting:
Under statutory fee shifting the loser pays the fees, while under
the common fund doctrine the victorious class pays them ....
Under fee shifting, the court awards fees in addition to whatever
primary relief it grants the plaintiffs, and the amount of fees
does not change the amount or type of the plaintiffs' relief. In
contrast, under the common fund doctrine, as fees are
subtracted from the fund, the amount available to satisfy class
members' claims diminishes. The size of the fees therefore
affects the size of the class members' relief."2
The payment of an attorney's fees under the common fund
doctrine creates conflict between the class and its attorney because
the class and attorney fight over how to divide the fund. Fee
shifting, however, eliminates this conflict because the defendant
222. Id. at 275.
223. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 216, at 1920.
224. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Cams, Alaska's English Rule:Attorney's Fee Shifting
in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 37 n.14 (1996) (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 37.
226. Id. at 34; Maggs & Weiss, supra note 216, at 1938 (depicting the Alaska Fee Shifting
Schedule for Plaintiffs).
227. Martha Pacold, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes,
68 U. CM. L. REV. 1007, 1015 (2001).
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will have to pay the attorney's fees and costs separately in addition
to any monetary judgment award for the class.22 The greatest
advantage to fee shifting in the class action context, therefore, is its
ability to obviate conflict between class members and their attorney
because the defendant, instead of the class, will compensate the
class attorney.
The biggest weakness to the fee-shifting strategy is that most
fee-shifting statutes require that to receive an award of attorneys'
fees and costs, the party must "prevail." 9 Whether a class has
prevailed when they settle, however, is a complicated and unsettled
question.230 This creates enormous incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys
to settle at the expense of their clients because class attorneys, who
are forced to compensate the defendant's attorney if they lose the
case, are much more risk adverse than their client class. 2 1 This
reintroduces a conflict between class members who have much less
to lose by proceeding to trial than their class attorney who faces
enormous costs if she loses (not only will the class attorney be
unable to recover her own out-of-pocket expenses, she will also have
to pay the defendant's costs and expenses). 2 Class attorneys may
prematurely settle the claim thereby lowering the class' recovery."
The evidence, however, does not conclusively support the propo-
sition that fee shifting creates undue pressure to settle. A study of
Alaska's cases found that depending on the context, fee shifting
"increased the value of reasonable cases, pushed strong cases
toward trial and caused some plaintiffs to discount their claims."23'
Some even argue that this is actually an advantage because "the
English Rule ... is supposed to depress the settlement value of a suit
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1012.
230. See generally id. at 1012-14 (discussing when these plaintiffs are considered the
prevailing party).
231. Id. at 1008-09.
232. Mark S. Stein, The English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative
Appraisal, 71 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 603, 621 (1995) ("Because the plaintiff does not share in
these risks, it will sometimes be in the lawyers's interest to accept a settlement that is not
in the plaintiffs interest.*).
233. Pacold, supra note 227, at 1008-09.
234. Di Pietro & Cams, supra note 224, at 81.
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that is likely to fail," and likewise, effectively encourage the parties
to bring only the strongest claims to trial.23
As Hensler and Rowe suggest, more investigation into the
potential success or failure of this proposal needs to be conducted.23 6
There are many ways that loser-pays attorney fee shifting could be
improved to be a better tool for monitoring class counsel. For
example, allowing plaintiffs who settle in certain cases to be
considered "prevailing" might reduce the incentive to settle and in
turn, reduce the conflict between the class and its counsel in certain
situations. It might also be possible to adjust attorneys' fees that
are awarded under the shifting regime to "equalize the expected
results of judgment to match those of settlement."2 7
Despite the possible conflicts that fee shifting might create, it
could very well prove to be a more beneficial monitoring tool for
class members in small claims class actions than the American
Rule. For example, the English Rule may better serve consumer
claims for relatively small amounts of money. Under the American
Rule, "the fee charged by the [class attorney] may exceed the
amount of recovery."238 "Under the English Rule, a defendant would
be more likely to replace or provide a refund for the cost of a
consumer good if he knew he would have to pay the plaintiffs
attorney fees in addition to any judgment awarded."219 As opposed
to the current system, therefore, the English Rule could assist
plaintiffs in receiving better settlements.
Another less radical alternative is to increase class members'
ability to monitor their counsel in small claims class actions in
conjunction with increased judicial oversight. This proposal would
allow a judge to impose sanctions on plaintiffs' attorneys who
propose a settlement that contains excessive attorneys' fees and/or
is not in the class' best interests. This proposal is essentially an
extension of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
235. Stein, supra note 232, at 622.
236. Hensler & Rowe, supra note 214, at 153.
237. Pacold, supra note 227, at 1029-30 (suggesting four recommendations to better
achieve this goal).
238. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 216, at 1928; see supra notes 158-66 and accompanying
text (discussing the settlement award of a class action lawsuit against major airlines that
resulted in $16 million in attorneys' fees but only nominal discount coupons for class
members).
239. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 216, at 1928.
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which allows courts to impose sanctions on attorneys for filing
frivolous lawsuits. Congress, when drafting the PSLRA, in order to
strengthen Rule l's application, required "the court to include
in the record specific findings, at the conclusion of the action, as
to whether all parties and all attorneys have complied with
each requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."240 By encouraging courts to enforce Rule 11 more
frequently, Congress intended to reduce the number of meritless
securities lawsuits.24' Evidence suggests that since passing the
PSLRA, courts have been applying this heightened Rule 11 pro-
2421vision.
Analogously, Congress or the Federal Rules Committee could
enact another rule or amend Rule 11 to allow courts to impose
sanctions on attorneys who accept a settlement that is clearly
unfavorable to the class, including, but not limited to, settlements
that provide class counsel with exorbitant attorneys' fees.
Increasing the court's enforcement ability against settlement
awards which unjustly favor class counsel at the expense of class
members in small claim class actions could have a deterrent effect
similar to that of applying the heightened Rule 11 provision in
securities class actions.
Finally, another less drastic alternative that Marc Gross
suggested in response to Hensler and Rowe's fee-shifting proposal
is to subject settlement agreements to greater scrutiny by the public
through posting the agreements on the Internet.' Gross argues
that increasing disclosure to public citizens, watchdog groups, and
the press will deter frivolous and abusive settlements.2" Indeed,
Congress has already implemented a similar provision that
mandates sufficient disclosure of antitrust settlements in cases
240. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995).
241. Id.
242. Marc I. Gross, Loser-Pays--Or Whose "Fault" 18 it Anyway: A Response to Hensler-
Rowe's "Beyond 'It Just Ain't Worth It," 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 172-73 (2001)
(discussing Polar Int'l Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 120 F. Supp. 2d 267,271-72 (2d Cir. 2000),
Simon DeBartolo Group L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 178 (2d Cir.
1999), and Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 87-C2198, 2001 WL 290402 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 22, 2001), securities class actions in which the courts rejected settlement agreements
or the claims themselves after ruling them frivolous).
243. Id. at 174.
244. Id.
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brought by the government to ensure that settlements are in the
public interest. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, also
known as the Tunney Act,245 requires that the Justice Department
file a "competitive impact statement" with the court explaining
any proposed settlement and how it will affect competition in the
relevant market. 2" The public has sixty days to submit comments
after the statement is filed, and the Department must file its
responses with the court and publish them in the Federal Register
during this sixty-day time period. 247 The court then holds a hearing
and rules on whether the proposed settlement is in the public
interest.24 The statute has been enforced as illustrated by a suit
brought by the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) claiming that the
competitive impact statement filed by the Justice Department
associated with the Microsoft settlement needed to be supple-
mented with additional information. 249 The AAI desired information
such as the alternative remedies considered and rejected, details
about the Department of Justice's evaluation, and an explanation
of how the settlement would affect private antitrust lawsuits
pending against Microsoft.25 °
These are just a few suggestions for resolving this problem. It is
clear, however, that small claims class actions require a regulatory
solution instead of a market-based solution, as even fee shifting
would require a statutory or regulatory mandate. Reformers,
therefore, should focus their efforts on creating a regulatory
mechanism that will allow judges, and maybe even the public, to
more effectively review settlement agreements on behalf of class
members.
V. CONCLUSION
For class actions in which a lead plaintiff provision analogous to
the PSLRA's provision would be effective, it is the optimum tool for
245. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000).
246. Id. § 16(d).
247. Id. § 16(e).
248. Id.
249. See Suit Seeks to Force Broader Disclosures by DOJ, Microsoft, 19 No. 13 ANDREWS
COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. LITIG. REP., Jan. 29, 2002, at 4.
250. Id.
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emulating the ordinary attorney-client relationship. Not only does
it conserve judicial resources that would otherwise be needed to
select and monitor class counsel, it also ensures fairer settlements
for class members, including more reasonable attorneys' fees.
Alternative reform mechanisms, such as increasing judicial
oversight in selecting class counsel, reviewing settlement
agreements, or selecting class counsel through conducting auctions,
do not provide adequate safeguards to class members' interests.
Many judges do not have adequate time or information to conduct
an investigation into a settlement agreement. Likewise, settling
parties have a strong disincentive to reveal any information that
would jeopardize gaining the court's approval of their agreement,
especially one that generously compensates class counsel.
Selecting lead counsel through a bidding process does not
adequately protect class interests because the lowest bidder may
provide lower quality representation, be reluctant to expend more
than he can recover due to a fee cap in the bidding contract, and be
risk-averse to pursuing a larger settlement that would actually be
a truer reflection of the class action's worth.
There are several factors that have made the lead plaintiff
provision successful in securities class actions: (1) homogenous
damages that can be fairly and objectively allocated in a settlement
agreement, (2) the probability of repeat performances by insti-
tutional investors as lead plaintiffs, thereby increasing their
influence over lead counsel, and (3) an objective factor, namely, the
size of the investor's stake, to use in easily determining the most
adequate lead plaintiff in terms of both sophistication and financial
resources.
Based on these factors, the lead plaintiff provision could be
expanded to class actions where (1) members of the class have
suffered from similar types of damages so that the settlement
allocation would only have to account for quantitative differences,
(2) the lead plaintiff has some mechanism available for exercising
influence over lead counsel, and (3) an objective or nearly objective
test could be employed to fairly and accurately determine the most
adequate lead plaintiff.
Antitrust class actions most easily meet these criteria because
generally all of the class members are consumers who have suffered
the same type of damage, namely economic loss, from a provider's
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monopolistic activities. Moreover, any damages recovered could
easily be allocated based on the quantitative differences in suffered
losses, and the lead plaintiff could be objectively determined as the
class member who suffered the greatest loss.
Effectively applying the lead plaintiff provision to other class
actions requires the class action to contain (1) members who have
suffered similar damages and (2) motivated members who have the
resources to monitor lead counsel. The effectiveness of the lead
plaintiff provision in other class actions decreases as class damages
become less similar. As illustrated by employee discrimination class
actions, however, the lead plaintiff provision remains an effective
tool for class actions in which there are only slight differences
among class members with respect to the substance and size of
their damages. At the extreme, however, damages suffered by class
members of mass tort litigation are so diverse that it is impossible
for one class member to effectively represent the entire class as lead
plaintiff.
The lead plaintiff provision is also unsuitable for small claims
litigation because the other necessary element, motivated members
who have the resources to serve as lead plaintiff, is missing. Small
claims litigation violates this second requirement because the time
and cost involved in serving as lead counsel outweigh the damage
recovery a class member is likely to receive.
There are other reform alternatives for mass tort and small
claims class actions, however, that will better serve to protect class
members' interests than the current system. For mass tort class
actions, increasing the ability of class members to opt out of the
class actions after the approval of the proposed settlement would be
a more effective monitoring tool. For small claim class action
litigation, providing judges more information with which to re-
view settlement agreements, employing a loser-pays fee-shifting
mechanism, imposing sanctions on class counsel who enter into
abusive settlement agreements, and subjecting settlement
agreements to greater scrutiny by the public are all options worthy
of consideration.
The reform proposals mentioned in this Note, especially
extending the lead plaintiff provision to other types of class actions,
are just a few of the ways to effectively reform class actions and
better protect class interests. The success of the PSLRA lead
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plaintiff provision in securities class actions and its potential to
help class members in other class actions better monitor their class
counsel and attain better settlement awards, should spur Congress
and state legislatures to employ this provision in more class action
litigation, especially antitrust suits. Indeed, rulemaking bodies can
no longer sit idly by or continue to advocate traditional oversight
procedures that allow lawyers to recover windfall profits at the
expense of their class. Without reform, the value of class action
litigation will amount to little more than a free box of cereal.
Kendra S. Langlois
